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BOARD GENDER QUOTAS IN GERMANY 
AND THE EU: AN APPROPRIATE WAY OF 
EQUALISING THE PARTICIPATION OF 
WOMEN AND MEN? 
RAPHAEL KOCH∗ 
The professional equalisation of men and women has become one of the most 
discussed topics in politics over the last years. As a solution to this problem 
many European countries have introduced regulations which ensure special 
quotas for women on the managing boards of companies. The main problem 
concerning such gender quotas is that the equalisation of men and women is 
primarily a sociopolitical objective which might result in a possible conflict 
with national and European constitutional law. Consequently, the current 
legal situation in Germany and the EU needs to be analysed critically. 
Therefore the different ways of incorporating gender quotas into the existing 
legal system must be compared with each other. 
I INTRODUCTION 
If you take a look at current developments and perspectives in company law, 
you will notice that companies — particularly stock corporations under German 
law (Aktiengesellschaften) — have been given greater responsibility for the 
realisation of sociopolitical goals in recent years. The overlap between the law 
governing stock corporations and sociopolitical thinking has become a 
fashionable topic.1 Both the German and the European legislators are pursuing 
the realisation of sociopolitical goals in this regard. Under the key words 
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1 Mathias Habersack, ‘Staatliche und halbstaatliche Eingriffe in die Unternehmensführung — 
Gutachten E’, Verhandlungen des 69 Deutschen Juristentages, München, 2012, vol 1, 2012) 33. 
See also Holger Fleischer, ‘Zukunftsfragen der Corporate Governance in Deutschland und 
Europa: Aufsichtsräte, Institutionelle Investoren, Proxy Advisors und Whistleblowers’ (2011) 
40 Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 155, 157. 
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‘corporate governance’ or ‘corporate social responsibility’, it is widely 
discussed whether and to what extent sociopolitical (wishful) thinking as an 
aspect of good company management can and should be made the object of 
legislation. The fact that company law is increasingly influenced by social 
developments is shown by the Act on the Appropriateness of Management 
Board Remuneration (Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung 
[‘VorstAG’]), for example2. Meanwhile, section 87 paragraph 1 of the Stock 
Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz [‘AktG’]) requires that the salaries of members 
of the management board be ‘in reasonable proportion to the duties and services 
of the members of the management board’, and that they be aligned with 
‘sustainable company development’. Even though the limitation of 
management board salaries is primarily a reaction to the financial crisis, it also 
addresses social issues at the same time.3 In recent times, this development has 
been particularly clear in discussions on introducing statutory quotas on the 
proportion of women in management positions in companies. The call for 
‘gender diversity’ has not stopped at company law.4 The realisation of equal 
opportunities for the professional equality of men and women is primarily a 
sociopolitical goal.5 It is problematic in this respect, and therefore particularly 
worthy of discussion, as quotas on the number of women occupying board 
positions constitute a form of ‘state intervention’ in corporate internal 
conflicts.6 
At first glance, the figures and statistics support the introduction of statutory 
quotas. A study by the German Institute for Economic Research (Deutsches 
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) found that, in 2013, the proportion of women 
on the management boards of the Top 200 companies was only 4.4 per cent, 
and the proportion on supervisory boards was 15.1 per cent.7 The reasons given 
2 Act of July 31 2009 BGBl. I 2509. 
3 Thomas M J Möllers and Sabrina Hailer, ‘Möglichkeiten und Grenzen staatlicher und 
halbstaatlicher Eingriffe in die Unternehmensführung’ (2012) 67 Juristische Zeitung 841, 847. 
See also in full Ulrich Seibert, ‘Die Koalitionsarbeitsgruppe “Managervergütungen”: 
Rechtspolitische Überlegungen zur Beschränkung der Vorstandsvergütung (Ende 2007 bis 
März 2009)’, in: Festschrift für Uwe Hüffer zum 70 Geburtstag (C H Beck, 2010) 955ff and 
Gregor Bachmann, ‘Corporate Governance nach der Finanzkrise’ (2011) 56 Die 
Aktiengesellschaft 181, 185 with further references. 
4 Habersack, above n 1, 34. 
5 Katja Langenbucher, ‘Frauenquote und Gesellschaftsrecht’ (2011) 66 Juristische Zeitung 1038; 
Habersack, above n 1, 34. 
6 Walter Bayer, ‘Grundsatzfragen der Regulierung der aktienrechtlichen Corporate Governance’ 
(2013) 16 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 1, 6. 
7 Elke Holst and Anja Kirsch, ‘Frauen sind in Vorständen großer Unternehmen in Deutschland 
noch immer die Ausnahme — moderat steigende Anteile in Aufsichtsräten’ (2014) 3 Deutsches 
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung: Wochenbericht 20 <http://www.diw.de/ 
documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.435168.de/14-3-1.pdf>. 
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for this included personality differences between men and women, as well as 
structural obstacles such as the compatibility of family and a career.8 The very 
real under-representation of women in management positions is not just a 
German phenomenon. It can also be seen in many other European countries, 
with Scandinavia having the highest quotas.9 Interestingly, it is within society 
that there is the greatest agreement on the necessity to introduce quotas on 
women, but the exact organisation of such quotas is fiercely disputed.10  
This article provides an overview of current developments in Germany and the 
European Union. Following a brief description of the advantages and 
disadvantages of quotas on women in managerial roles (Part II), the status quo 
in Germany and the EU is addressed and current legislation is discussed (Part 
III). The constitutional hurdles and the hurdles in European law of 
implementing quotas on women are then taken into consideration (Part IV). 
Finally, the legal situation is critically evaluated (Part V) and the prospect of 
future development is examined (Part VI). 
II ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF QUOTAS ON 
WOMEN 
Advocates of quotas on women occupying management positions refer to 
studies in which ‘gender diversity’ in management positions leads to greater 
economic success for the company.11 The increased involvement of women on 
management boards is said to lead to more ideas and creativity in corporate 
decisions, and these decisions are said to be more closely scrutinised; potential 
8 See Kathrin Brandt, Gleichstellungsquote im Aufsichtsrat der Aktiengesellschaft (Peter Lang, 
2012) 34ff. 
9 See statistical data in Marcus Schladebach and Georgia Stefanopoulou, ‘Frauenquote in 
Aufsichtsräten — Überlegungen zur Änderung des Aktienrechts’ (2010) 65 Betriebs-Berater 
1042, 1043. 
10 Leonhard Knoll and Daniel Lochner, ‘Diskriminierung durch Quote?’ (2014) 67 Der Betrieb 
495. 
11 For example, see various studies by McKinsey & Company on the topic ‘Women Matter’ 
<http://www.mckinsey.com/features/women_matter>; also the references in Ina Anne Frost 
and Leena Linnainmaa, ‘Corporate Governance — Frauen im Aufsichtsrat — Können wir von 
unseren skandinavischen Nachbarn lernen?’ (2007) 52 Die Aktiengesellschaft 601, 609; Hans-
Jürgen Papier and Martin Heidebach, ‘Die Einführung einer gesetzlichen Frauenquote für die 
Aufsichtsräte deutscher Unternehmen unter verfassungsrechtlichen Aspekten’ (2011) 40 
Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschaftsrecht 305, 309ff; Bachmann, above n 3, 189; 
also Barbara Mayer, ‘Vier Thesen für die Frauenquote in Aufsichtsräten’ (2011) 61 
Anwaltsblatt 919. 
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economic growth is better exploited.12 Also in line with this is the argument 
that the negative effects of the financial crisis would not have occurred if there 
had been a higher proportion of women on corporate boards.13 However, too 
much significance should not be attributed to assumptions and investigations 
of this sort. Ultimately, all studies are burdened with the problem that it cannot 
be demonstrated whether a company would be more or less successful in the 
same reference period with more or fewer women in management positions.14 
It is also pointed out that the qualification level of women has grown in recent 
years, which is why the under-representation of women on supervisory boards 
is no longer justifiable.15 The current situation is put down to the issue that men 
would rather appoint a man in case of doubt and critically compare female 
applications with each other (‘cartel argument’).16 
A clear disadvantage of quotas on women is that every quota automatically 
constitutes discrimination against male applicants. In other words, a quota on 
women would have the effect of a government ban on filling a specific portion 
of the supervisory board with male candidates.17 If the under-representation of 
women were called discrimination, the introduction of quotas on women would 
lead to a so-called ‘reverse discrimination’ against men,18 so to speak, the 
admissibility of which would have to be determined by constitutional 
benchmarks in particular.19 However, a quota regulation is associated with a 
12 European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Improving the Gender Balance among Non-Executive Directors of Companies 
Listed on Stock Exchanges and Related Measures (COM(2012), 14 November 2012, 614 final) 
(‘EC Draft Directive 2012’) 4. 
13 European Commission, Green Paper – Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and 
Remuneration Policies (COM(2010), 2 June 2010, 284 final) 7, 13. Therefore, it is not 
surprising when statements such as ‘This wouldn’t have happened like that with the Lehman 
Sisters’ appear in the media: cited in Brandt, above n 8, 15. 
14 Bachmann, above n 3, 189. See also Heribert Hirte, ‘Frauenquote oder Frauenförderung’ 
(2013) 11 Der Konzern 367, 371; Thüsing, ‘Die Frauenquote ist europarechtswidrig’, 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 December 2014, 16. 
15 Draft Act by the Federal Government for the Equal Participation of Men and Women in 
Management Positions in Private Industry and Public Services (Entwurf eines Gesetzes für die 
gleichberechtigte Teilhabe von Frauen und Männern an Führungspositionen in der 
Privatwirtschaft und im öffentlichen Dienst), 11 December 2014, 48 <http://www.bmjv. 
de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/Gesetze/GE-Frauenquote.pdf;jsessionid=08C7AC077 
DE5817999C517E551D8FC8C.1_cid297?__blob=publicationFile>. 
16 Mayer, above n 11, 919. 
17 Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 314. 
18 This principle also exists in US law. The so-called ‘affirmative actions’ there are intended to 
achieve the equality of African Americans on the labour market in particular. See Matthias 
Döring, Frauenquoten und Verfassungsrecht (Duncker & Humblot, 1996) 16ff in this regard. 
19 See also below Part IVA. 
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certain degree of discrimination against women at the same time: a woman will 
no longer be employed on the grounds of her qualifications and experience but 
rather on the grounds of her gender — she thus becomes a ‘token woman’.20 
The issue of introducing quotas on women is therefore associated with the issue 
of the professional quality of supervisory board members. There are concerns 
about whether there are even enough suitably qualified women to fill 
supervisory boards.21 Therefore, opponents of quotas on women stress that the 
qualifications and quality of a potential supervisory board member must be 
decisive for their appointment first and foremost.22 This is another reason why 
company law is not considered adequate for the realisation of sociopolitical 
(wishful) thinking.23 Quotas on women are deemed an alarming ‘foreign body 
in the law governing stock corporations’.24 
However, the advantages and disadvantages of quotas on women still only play 
a minor role in the current discussion. As the political decision to increase the 
proportion of women on boards in Germany and the EU was made long ago,25 
the only issue for discussion now is the specific organisation and 
implementation of a quota on women.26 The advantages and disadvantages of 
a quota on women should not be completely ignored, however; they may still 
be important stimuli for the organisation of a statutory quota. 
III THE STATUS QUO IN GERMANY AND THE EU 
A Germany 
Before statutory quotas were introduced, the legal situation in Germany was 
characterised by the ‘principle of voluntary obligation’.27 The German 
20 Gerd Krieger, ‘Keine Gesetzliche Frauenquote für Aufsichtsräte’ (2011) 61 Anwaltsblatt 918; 
Martin Peltzer, ‘Der Bericht der Corporate Governance Kommission an die Bundesregierung’ 
(2011) 14 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 281, 283. 
21 Bayer, above n 6, 8. 
22 Krieger, above n 20, 918. 
23 Peter Mülbert, ‘Corporate Governance in der Krise’ (2010) 174 Zeitschrift für das gesamte 
Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht 375, 380, 384; Bachmann, above n 3, 189 with further 
references. 
24 Habersack, above n 1, 36. 
25 See also Part III below. 
26 Bachmann, above n 3, 189; Marc-Philippe Weller, ‘Wie Quoten juristisch durchgesetzt werden 
können’ Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 June 2011, 19; Bayer, above n 6, 9. 
27 An overview of the development of quotas on women in recent years can also be found in 
Christoph Teichmann and Carolin Langes, ‘Frauenquote in Deutschland und Europa’ (2013) 
24 Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht 175f; Stefanie Jung, ‘Eine Frauenquote für die 
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Corporate Governance Code (‘GCGC’) (Deutscher Corporate Governance 
Kodex),28 does indeed state with regard to the appointment of the supervisory 
board that specific targets should be set for the board’s composition, and that 
these targets should specify an ‘adequate proportion of women’ in particular 
(GCGC [5.4.1]).29 The legal nature of the provisions of the GCGC means that 
they are only recommendations, however, and are not legal obligations for 
companies. In this respect, this can be considered a soft law approach.30 In 
accordance with the so-called ‘comply or explain’ principle, companies can 
also deviate from the recommendations provided that they disclose and justify 
this.31 
1 Legislative Process  
In their coalition treaty in 2013, the current German government comprising 
the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union [‘CDU’]), 
the Christian Social Union (Christlich Soziale Union [‘CSU’]) and the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands 
[‘SPD’]) stated their wish to increase the proportion of women on company 
boards.32 There had been previous attempts to introduce a quota on women.33 
However, these plans were not implemented in previous parliamentary terms. 
In March 2014, the German Federal Ministries of Justice and Family Affairs 
(Bundesministerien für Justiz und Familien) published initial guidelines for the 
legislative procedure,34 which revisited the agreements in the coalition 
EU?’ (2013) 68 Betriebs-Berater 387, 388; Schladebach and Stefanopoulou, above n 9, 1043–
4; extensively Brandt, above n 8, 41ff. 
28 The latest version of the GCGC (as at 5 May 2015) is available at 
<http://www.dcgk.de/de/kodex.html>.  
29 Similar recommendations can commonly be found on appointments to management positions 
(GCGC [4.1.5]) and on the composition of the management board (GCGC [5.1.2]). 
30 Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 179. 
31 Preamble to the GCGC. 
32 Shaping Germany’s Future. Coalition Treaty between CDU/CSU and SPD (Deutschlands 
Zukunft gestalten. Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD) 2013, 72 
<https://www.cdu.de/sites/default/files/media/dokumente/koalitionsvertrag.pdf>. In 2012 there 
were two legislative initiatives by the Federal Council and the SPD fraction; see Teichmann 
and Langes, above n 27, 176. 
33 In particular, see the legislative proposals by Alliance 90/The Greens from 2007 (BT-
Drucksache 16/5279 <http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/052/1605279.pdf> 
[Parliamentary Documentation of the German Bundestag]) and 2009 (BT-Drucksache 16/12108 
<http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/121/1612108.pdf> [Parliamentary Documentation of 
the German Bundestag]). 
34 Act for the Equal Participation of Men and Women in Management Positions in Private 
Industry and Public Services. Guidelines for the Legislative Procedure, 24 March 2013 
<http://www.bmfsfj.de/BMFSFJ/gleichstellung,did=205630.html>. 
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agreement. A common draft bill was finally presented by both ministries in 
June 2014,35 which was amended in September 2014 (new version).36 The 
Federal Minister of Justice (Heiko Maas) expressly justified the procedure by 
stating that previous attempts at voluntary obligation had brought no success.37 
Over the next months the legislative process was delayed as — despite the 
coalition treaty — concerns were raised by parts of the coalition. Members of 
the CDU and CSU criticised the inflexibility of the draft bill, especially as there 
were no exemptions (‘hardship clauses’) from the quota regulation.38 
Nevertheless, the leaders of the ruling parties were able to reach a final 
agreement on the draft bill,39 which was approved by the German federal 
government on 11 December 2014.40 In March 2015 both chambers 
(Bundestag41 and Bundesrat42) of the German parliament finally passed the 
Law for the Equal Participation of Men and Women in Management Positions 
in Private Industry and Public Services (Gesetz für die gleichberechtigte 
Teilhabe von Frauen und Männern an Führungspositionen in der 
Privatwirtschaft und im öffentlichen Dienst).43 The introduction of a statutory 
quota on women is intended to increase the proportion of women in 
35 Draft Act for the Equal Participation of Men and Women in Management Positions in Private 
Industry and Public Services, 20 June 2014 <http://www.arbrb.de/media/ 
Referentenentwurf_Geschlechterquote.pdf>. 
36 Joachim Jahn, ‘Gesetz für Frauenquote wird entschärft’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 
September 2014, 16. 
37 ‘Voluntarily, it won’t work. The mandatory quota is coming; there will be no exceptions. The 
time of fruitless lip service is over’ (‘Freiwillig funktioniert es nicht. Die verbindliche Quote 
kommt, da wird es keine Ausnahmen geben. Die Zeit der fruchtlosen Lippenbekenntnisse ist 
vorbei’: Press Release by the Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 
(Gemeinsamer Referentenentwurf zur Frauenquote vorgestellt) 22 June 2014 
<http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Interviews/DE/2014/Print/20140622_BZ_Frauenquote.htm
l?nn=343322>. 
38 Constanze von Bullion, ‘Warten auf ein Machtwort der Kanzlerin’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24 
November 2014, 4. 
39 ‘Koalitionsausschuss: Schwarz-rot einigt sich auf Frauenquote’, Die Zeit (online), 26 
November 2014 <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2014-11/frauenquote-einigung-
koalition>. 
40 ‘Förderung von Frauen in Führungspositionen: Kabinett beschließt Gesetzentwurf zur 
Frauenquote’, Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, 11 December 2014, 
<http://www.bmjv.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/DE/2014/20141211-Frauenquote.html?nn 
=3433226>. 
41 ‘Mehr Frauen in Führungspositionen — Bundestag beschließt Gesetz zur Frauenquote’, 




43 Act of April 24 2015 BGBl. I 642. 
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management positions. Another declared objective of the new law is the 
reduction of the wage gap between men and women.44  
2 Content of the New Law  
The gender quota is directly embedded into company law. In companies that 
are listed on the stock market and subject to co-determination, from 2016 at 
least 30 per cent of the supervisory board must be women, and at least 30 per 
cent must be men. The gender quota applies for both shareholders’ 
representatives and employees’ representatives.45 The number of companies 
affected by this is estimated to be approximately 108.46 If the gender quota is 
not complied with, the election of the supervisory board shall be invalid47 so 
that the supervisory board posts provided for women remain free (so-called 
empty seats).48  
For companies that are either listed on the stock market or subject to co-
determination, a so-called ‘flexi-quota’ applies from 30 September 2015.49 
About 3500 companies will be affected by this rule.50 Under this rule, the 
supervisory board has to set target figures for increasing the proportion of 
women both on the supervisory board and the executive board.51 Consequently, 
there is no obligation to achieve a special quota.52 If the proportion of women 
was below 30 per cent when the targets were set, companies are not permitted 
to fall below this status quo.53 In contrast to the strict 30 per cent quota there 
are no sanctions when the flexi-quota is not complied with. The ‘comply or 
44 Draft Act by the Federal Government for the Equal Participation of Men and Women in 
Management Positions in Private Industry and Public Services, above n 15, 49. 
45 Aktiengesetz [AktG] § 96 para 2. 
46 Draft Act by the Federal Government for the Equal Participation of Men and Women in 
Management Positions in Private Industry and Public Services, above n 15, 51. 
47 AktG § 250 para 1 no 5. 
48 Draft Act by the Federal Government for the Equal Participation of Men and Women in 
Management Positions in Private Industry and Public Services, above n 15, 52. 
49 Einführungsgesetz zum Aktiengesetz [EGAktG] § 25 para 1. Such a model was previously 
proposed by the former Federal Minister of Family Affairs Kristina Schröder. According to it 
the proportion of women should be determined independently and reported publicly. See 
Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 176. 
50 Draft Act by the Federal Government for the Equal Participation of Men and Women in 
Management Positions in Private Industry and Public Services, above n 15, 54. 
51 AktG § 111 para 5. 
52 Ingrid Ohmann-Sauer and Moritz Langemann, ‘Der Referentenentwurf zur Einführung einer 
“gesetzlichen Frauenquote’ (2014) 31 Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 1120, 1125. 
53 AktG § 111 para 5. 
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explain’ principle from the GCGC still applies, however.54 Originally the draft 
bill from June 2014 stated that the self-determined target figures must require 
the appointment of at least one man and one woman (so-called effective 
appointment).55 This was intended to prevent solely men or women being 
appointed to supervisory boards.56 However, according to data from the 
Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie), the 
supervisory boards of approximately 60 per cent of these companies consist of 
only three people.57 Therefore, via a loophole, a rigid 33 per cent quota for both 
genders would have been introduced for a number of companies. Consequently, 
the new version of the draft bill of 9 September 201458 already no longer 
featured the wording ‘the target figures must require the appointment of at least 
one man and one woman’.  
The same is true for other managing positions. The executive board must also 
set target figures for increasing the proportion of women in positions below the 
supervisory and the executive board.59 The goal of this regulation is to promote 
women at all operational levels.60  
Companies in the legal form of a European Company (Societas Europaea 
[‘SE’]) also fall under the quota regulation.61 A stock listed SE whose 
54 Handelsgesetzbuch [HGB] § 289a para 2; see Ohmann-Sauer and Langemann, above n 52, 
1125. 
55 AktG-E § 111 para 5 as in the version of the Draft Act by the Federal Government for the Equal 
Participation of Men and Women in Management Positions in Private Industry and Public 
Services, 20 June 2014, above n 35. 
56 Draft Act by the Federal Government for the Equal Participation of Men and Women in 
Management Positions in Private Industry and Public Services, above n 35, 102. 
57 Joachim Jahn, ‘Frauenquote trifft viel mehr Firmen als angekündigt’, Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung (online), 24 June 2014 <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftspolitik/ 
gesetzentwurf-der-spd-frauenquote-trifft-viel-mehr-firmen-als-angekuendigt-13008330. 
html>. 
58 See Joachim Jahn, ‘Gesetz für Frauenquote wird entschärft’, above n 36, 16.   
59 AktG § 76 para 4. 
60 Draft Act by the Federal Government for the Equal Participation of Men and Women in 
Management Positions in Private Industry and Public Services, above n 15, 145–6; see also 
Gregor Thüsing, ‘Gerechtigkeit à la européenne: Diskriminierungsschutz in einer 
pluralistischen Gesellschaft’ (2014) 13 Zeitschrift für europäisches Sozial- und Arbeitsrecht 
364, 371. 
61 Draft Act by the Federal Government for the Equal Participation of Men and Women in 
Management Positions in Private Industry and Public Services, above n 15, 51–2, 165–6. 
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supervising board consists of the same number of representatives of both the 
shareholders and the employees must fulfil the 30 per cent quota.62 
B European Union 
In November 2012, the European Commission issued a proposal for a directive 
to guarantee the balanced representation of men and women in leading 
corporate positions (hereinafter referred to as the Draft Quota on Women 
Directive).63 According to this, the proportion of women in the positions of 
non-executive directors and supervisory board members should be 40 per cent 
by 2020.64 On the other hand, a fixed quota is not specified for executive 
directors and board members. This is solely intended to ensure the balanced 
representation of both genders in EU member states.65 This compromise should 
avoid too much interference in the company structure.66 Only listed companies 
would fall within the scope of application of the Directive; small and medium-
sized companies would be exempt.67 According to EU data, approximately 
5000 companies would be affected by the Directive.68 The affected companies 
would have to report to the member states on an annual basis with regard to 
whether the targets had been reached.69 In this respect, the proposed Directive 
would impose a mixture of a fixed quota on the one hand and a voluntary 
obligation on the other. Breaches of the targets would be subject to sanctions. 
Member states would be responsible for implementing the targets, which could 
impose sanctions such as penalties, the invalidity of appointments to a 
supervisory board, and declarations of invalidity by a court.70 
62 Gesetz zur Ausführung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2157/2001 des Rates vom 8. Oktober 2001 
über das Statut der Europäischen Gesellschaft (SE) [SEAG] § 17 para 2; see also SEAG § 24 
para 3.  
63 EC Draft Directive 2012, above n 12. With regard to previous EU measures see Jung, above n 
27, 387f. The question of whether article 157 para 3 TFEU is a suitable legal basis is strongly 
disputed. See also Jens Koch, ‘EU-Kompetenz für eine Frauenquote in den Führungsgremien 
von Aktiengesellschaften’ (2011) 175 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und 
Wirtschaftsrecht 827ff; Knoll and Lochner, above n 10, 497 with further references; Teichmann 
and Langes, above n 27, 181 with further references. 
64 EC Draft Directive 2012, above n 12, art 4(1). 
65 Ibid art 5(1). 
66 Ibid art 6. 
67 Ibid art 1, 3. 
68 Jung, above n 27, 389. 
69 EC Draft Directive 2012, above n 12, art 5(2). 
70 Ibid art 6(2) a) and b). 
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The legislative procedure for adopting this Directive is not yet complete. In 
November 2013, the European Parliament approved the Commission’s 
proposal for a directive. However, the adoption of the Directive still requires 
the approval of the Council (also referred to as the EU Council of Ministers).71 
In July 2013, nine member states — including Germany — reaffirmed in a joint 
declaration that they do not agree with the proposal for a directive. This 
achieved a blocking minority, which could prevent the adoption of the planned 
Directive.72 Given the current legislative plans of the German federal 
government, Germany could change its position again. In particular, the former 
EU Justice Commissioner, Viviane Reding, has expressed the hope that the 
German government will relent. Germany’s own plans could mean that it 
becomes a pioneer in the issue of quotas on women within the EU.73  
C Other European Countries 
There are also quota regulations in other European countries.74 It is primarily 
the Scandinavian countries that are role models, particularly Norway. A 
statutory quota requiring 40 per cent of the members of company management 
boards to be women was introduced there in 2003.75 A 40 per cent quota on 
women was passed in Spain in 2007; this must be implemented by the affected 
companies by 2015.76 France adopted a law on the equality of men and women 
on management and supervisory boards and on professional equality in 2011.77 
According to this law, both genders must be represented on the management 
and supervisory boards of large companies at a rate of at least 40 per cent from 
71 With regard to the legislative procedure in the EU, particularly on the correct legislative 
procedure in accordance with art 289 para 1, 294 TFEU [Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union], see Rudolf Streinz, Europarecht (C F Müller, 9th ed, 2012) 198ff. 
72 Florian Eder, ‘Frauenquote in der EU steht vor dem Aus’, Die Welt (online), 26 July 2013 
<http://www.welt.de/wirtschaft/article118412204/Frauenquote-in-der-EU-steht-vor-dem-
Aus.html>. With regard to the change in requirements for a qualified majority, which apply 
from 1 November 2014, see Streinz, above n 71, 122. 
73 ‘EU-Parlament stimmt für Frauenquote in Aufsichtsräten’, Die Zeit (online), 20 November 
2013 <http://www.zeit.de/karriere/2013-11/eu-parlament-frauenquote>. 
74 See the overview in Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 177–8 in this regard and the extensive 
coverage in Brandt, above n 8, 48ff with remarks on Norway, Spain and France. 
75 Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 177. See also Frost and Linnainmaa, above n 11, 603ff. 
76 Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 180; Brandt, above n 8, 52f. 
77 Loi relative à la représentation équilibrée des femmes et des hommes au sein des conseils 
d’administration et de surveillance et à l’égalité professionnelle, 28 January 2011 
<http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000023487662&dateTe
xte=&categorieLien=id>. See also Raphaële François-Poncet, Barbara Deilmann and Sabine 
Otte, ‘Frauenquote in französischen Aufsichts- und Verwaltungsräten — ist eine Quote auch in 
Deutschland zulässig?’ (2011) 14 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 450, 451ff. 
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2017.78 In the same year, the Netherlands passed a statutory quota of 30 per 
cent female membership of the management and supervisory boards of stock 
corporations.79 There is also a 33 per cent quota for both genders in Italy.80 
A statutory quota on women of at least 35 per cent by 2018 was introduced in 
Austria in 2011. However, this applies only to quasi-public companies — 
companies in which the state holds at least a 50 per cent interest.81 There is a 
similar regulation in Finland, which imposes a statutory quota of 40 per cent 
for public companies and companies that are majority-owned by the state.82 
On the other hand, there are still countries — especially Sweden — where no 
statutory quotas have been introduced yet.83 The Swedish Corporate 
Governance Code, like its German counterpart, only requires companies to 
endeavour to achieve an equal distribution of both genders.84 Finally, there are 
similar regulations in Denmark, where the principle of voluntary obligation also 
prevails. This is particularly apparent from the recent amendment of a law, 
according to which companies must set their own quota for the under-
represented gender and report this publicly.85  
D Interim Findings 
The introduction of quotas on women has been highly topical in European 
countries in recent years, which is why there is real talk of a ‘race’.86 Quotas on 
women are on the agenda! Of course, individual regulations differ from each 
other in the degree of female participation that they require, with a quota of 40 
per cent currently being the highest.87 The individual regulations can also be 
assigned to three categories: those in which quotas are targeted only at 
78 François-Poncet et al, above n 77, 452.  
79 Tineke Lambooy, ‘30% Women on Boards: New Law in the Netherlands (2012)’ (2012) 9 
European Company Law 53ff gives extensive coverage on this issue.  
80 Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 181. 
81 See Frauen in Spitzenpositionen. Modelle in Osterreich, Bundeskanzleramt Osterreich 
<http://www.bka.gv.at/site/6868/default.aspx>. 
82 Act on Equal Status and Equal Rights of Women and Men, No 10/2008 
<http://eng.velferdarraduneyti.is/media/acrobat-enskar_sidur/Act-on-equal-status-and-equal-
rights-of-women-and-men_no-10-2008.pdf>. 
83 Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 179. 
84 Swedish Corporate Governance Code (‘SCGC’) [III.4.1] <http://www.corporategovernance 
board.se/media/45322/svenskkodbolagsstyrn_2010_eng_korrigerad20110321.pdf>.  
85 See in full Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 179. 
86 François-Poncet et al, above n 77, 450. 
87 Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 183. 
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companies with a certain minimum size; those in which quotas apply only to 
majority-owned public companies; and, the third category that does not 
stipulate a quota but rather sets out for companies a voluntary obligation by 
way of a soft law. 
As evidenced by the current legal situation, the German legislator has taken the 
middle path. There is a fixed quota of 30 per cent for large companies on the 
one hand, and a flexi-quota for another 3500 companies on the other hand. 
IV LEGAL CHALLENGES OF INTRODUCING A QUOTA ON 
WOMEN 
A Challenges of German Constitutional Law 
In Germany, the constitutionality of a statutory quota on women is disputed,88 
and must be determined under articles 3, 9, 12 and 14 of the Basic Law for the 
Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz [‘GG’]).89 A possible breach of the 
general principle of equal treatment (article 3 paragraph 3 GG) is of particular 
interest here.90 
Article 3 paragraph 3 GG prohibits, amongst other things, discrimination on the 
grounds of gender. The introduction of quotas on women discriminates against 
men and is therefore an encroachment requiring justification.91 Justification 
may be founded on article 3 paragraph 2 clause 2 GG which states: ‘The state 
shall promote the actual implementation of equal rights for women and men 
and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist.’92 Intervention is 
88 Schladebach and Stefanopoulou, above n 9, 1046 argue the constitutional non-conformity of 
quotas on women; also Julia Redenius-Hövermann, ‘Zur Frauenquote im Aufsichtsrat’ (2010) 
31 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 660, 665–6. However, the constitutionality of quotas on 
women is affirmed by, amongst others, Joachim Wieland, ‘Ist eine Quotenregelung zur 
Erhöhung des Anteils der Frauen in Aufsichtsräten mit dem Grundgesetz und Europarecht 
vereinbar?’ (2010) 63 Neue Juristische Woche 2408, 2409; Heide M Pfarr, ‘Die Frauenquote’ 
(1995) 12 Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht 809, 812; Frost and Linnainmaa, above n 11, 610; 
Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 313ff., 333; Gregor Bachmann, ‘Zur Umsetzung einer 
Frauenquote im Aufsichtsrat’ (2011) 32 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 1131, 1139: ‘nicht per 
se verfassungswidrig’ [‘not unconstitutional per se’]. 
89 Langenbucher, above n 5, 1039. 
90 Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 313. 
91 Ibid 314. 
92 From a doctrinal point of view art 3 para 2 clause 2 GG is not a basic law but a state objective. 
Thus the individual cannot derive subjective rights from the provision. See Sonja Rademacher, 
Diskriminierungsverbot und ‘Gleichstellungsauftrag’ (Peter Lang, 2004) 91ff; Fritz Ossenbühl, 
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generally justified if it is for a legitimate purpose and is suitable, necessary and 
proportionate. The legitimacy of quotas on women arises from the federal 
government’s task of gender equality laid down in article 3 paragraph 2 clause 
2 GG.93 Quotas are appropriate for increasing the proportion of women on 
supervisory boards.94 This argument arouses some scepticism because there are 
not enough suitably qualified women to fill the empty posts.95 It is correct to 
assume that intervention is appropriate, however, as the ‘abstract possibility of 
achieving the goal’ (here: increasing the proportion of women) is sufficient in 
this respect.96 The necessity for quotas can be affirmed as previous measures 
have not led to a significant increase in the proportion of women on boards.97 
By contrast, the proportionality of the intervention cannot be affirmed. In the 
literature on constitutional law, the overriding view is that only so-called 
performance-related quotas are covered by the task of gender equality 
expressed in article 3 paragraph 2 clause 2 GG. Strict quotas are not permitted, 
however.98 The rule is not intended just to enable a gender quota per se.99 In the 
case of performance-related quotas candidates of the under-represented gender 
are preferred only if they are equally qualified.100 Therefore, equal professional 
opportunities always require equal professional qualifications.101 The European 
‘Frauenquoten für Leitungsorgane von Privatunternehmen’ (2012) 65 Neue Juristische Woche 
417, 418 with further references. 
93 Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 314. 
94 Ibid 315. 
95 Redenius-Hövermann, above n 88, 665; Schladebach and Stefanopoulou, above n 9, 1046; 
Hirte, above n 14, 376f. 
96 Decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court — Official Compilation [‘BVerfGE’] 
67 (1985) 157, 175 and (1985) 38 Neue Juristische Woche 121, 123; Gerald Spindler and 
Kathrin Brandt, ‘Verfassungsrechtliche Zulässigkeit einer Gleichstellungsquote im 
Aufsichtsrat der börsennotierten AG’ (2011) 14 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 401, 
403. 
97 Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 315; Knoll and Lochner, above n 10, 497. 
98 Decisions of the Federal Labor Court — Official Compilation [‘BAGE’] 104 (2004) 264, 269–
70; Lerke Osterloh in Michael Sachs (ed), Grundgesetz: Kommentar (C H Beck, 6th ed, 2011) 
[Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: Commentary], art 3 GG no 287; Werner 
Heun in: Horst Dreier (ed), Grundgesetz Kommentar (Mohr Siebeck, 2nd ed, 2004) 
[Commentary on the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany] art 3 GG no 112 with 
further references; Schladebach and Stefanopoulou, above n 9, 1046; Redenius-Hövermann, 
above n 88, 665; François-Poncet et al, above n 77, 454; Thüsing, above n 60, 372; for extensive 
information on current opinion see Rademacher, above n 92, 211ff. 
99 Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 318; Spindler and Brandt, above n 96, 402. 
100 Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 316. 
101 Osterloh, in Sachs, above n 98, art 3 GG no 287. A different view is held by Brandt, above n 
8, 185, according to which the requirement of equal qualification can never actually be 
achieved. Instead there would be the risk of this even being used as a reason not to appoint a 
woman, because the requirements of a performance-related quota would not be fulfilled even if 
there were only the smallest differences in qualifications. 
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Court of Justice reached the same conclusion in 2000, when it addressed the 
compatibility of the Equal Rights Act of Hesse (Hessisches 
Gleichberechtigungsgesetz) with European law.102 The fixed gender quota, 
which will apply from 2016 for listed companies and companies subject to co-
determination does not fulfil this requirement. It is a strict (as opposed to 
performance-related) quota, which — according to the prevailing opinion in the 
literature — does not comply with article 3 paragraph 3 GG. The current legal 
situation must be classed as unconstitutional in this respect.  
Intervention in the company’s freedom of economic activity — and thus 
occupational freedom (protected under article 12 paragraph 1 GG in 
conjunction with article 19 paragraph 3 GG) — is also present.103 However, 
this intervention is justified. A quota on women is a so-called profession-
governing regulation, which can be justified by reasonable considerations of 
general welfare (here the equality of men and women in the sense of article 3 
paragraph 2 clause 2 GG).104 
Additionally, quotas on women encroach on shareholders’ ownership rights, as 
share ownership is covered by the legal constitutional protection of article 14 
paragraph 1 GG.105 Such encroachment can be justified (as shown in particular 
by the judgment by the German Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) on the Co-Determination Act 
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz [‘MitbestG’])).106 This law states, in article 7 para 1 
MitBestG, half of the supervisory board is to be made up of shareholders’ 
102 European Court of Justice [EJC] — C-158/97 (2000) 53 Neue Juristische Woche 1549, 1551 
(no 23). However, it is questionable and disputed whether this jurisdiction — as in the case of 
the supervisory board — can be transferred to appointments to committees. See also Bachmann, 
above n 88, 1135; Thüsing, above n 60, 372. 
103 BVerfGE 50 (1979) 290, 361–2; Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 328. If, however, one 
focuses on the professional freedom of the candidate concerned, the protective scope of art 12 
para 1 GG cannot be considered open. As § 113 AktG does not make remuneration for 
supervisory board members compulsory, it is already doubtful whether a supervisory board 
mandate is an activity focused on earnings, established for the long-term, and serving to provide 
and maintain a livelihood: Schladebach and Stefanopoulou, above n 9, 1046. 
104 Brandt, above n 8, 129; Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 328; Spindler and Brandt, above 
n 96, 404. 
105 BVerfGE 50 (1979) 290, 341; Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 323; Knoll and Lochner, 
above n 10, 496. Based on all information, however, the scope of application of art 14 para 1 
GG will not be affected. A quota regulation would only encroach on the shareholders’ future 
opportunities, but not on the result of commercial activity; therefore only art 12 para 1 GG is 
affected; Döring, above n 18, 225 with further references.  
106 Gesetz über die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer (Germany) [Act on Employee Co-
Determination] (‘Mitbestimmungsgesetz’ – ‘MitbestG’) of 4 May 1976 BGBl. I 1153. On the 
transfer of the jurisdiction of the Federal Constitutional Court see Brandt, above n 8, 149ff. 
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representatives and half of employees’ representatives. If a restriction of 
shareholder rights of this nature withstands constitutional concerns,107 then 
surely a quota on women would do likewise. The shareholders’ election 
decision is not revoked by such a quota but rather is modified in so far as it is 
limited to persons of the under-represented gender (here: women). Such 
intervention is a little less severe than article 7 paragraph 1 MitbestG, where the 
shareholders’ election decision for half of the supervisory board posts is 
completely revoked.108 Intervention in the freedom of association would also 
be justified for the same reasons (article 9 paragraph 1 GG).109  
B Compatibility with European law 
At the European level, the question of whether quotas on women are compatible 
with primary and secondary European law is posed.110 Quotas on women 
represent no breach of the fundamental freedoms of the European Single 
Market — particularly the freedoms of establishment (article 49 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) and movement of capital 
(TFEU article 63).111 On the one hand, the quota on women has an equal effect 
on residents and foreigners when founding a company; on the other hand, even 
when the head office of a company is relocated to Germany, the ‘incorporation 
theory’ applies,112 which is why the law of the company’s state of incorporation 
continues to remain decisive.113 Quotas cause no breach of secondary Union 
law either. The Equal Treatment Directive would be taken into consideration 
here if necessary.114 Its scope of application is not open, however, as a 
107 BVerfGE 50 (1979) 290, 343ff. 
108 Rademacher, above n 92, 169; Wieland, above n 88, 2409; Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 
324ff; Möllers and Hailer, above n 3, 844; Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 177. Therefore, 
the quota on women should not lead to a ‘change in the structure or substance of share 
ownership’: Frost and Linnainmaa, above n 11, 610. 
109 See also Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 3279ff. 
110 With regard to the distinction between primary and secondary Union law see Streinz, above 
n 71, 1–2. 
111 Brandt, above n 8, 246ff; Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 329–30; but cf Schladebach and 
Stefanopoulou, above n 9, 1045. 
112 European Court of Justice [ECJ] – C-167/01 [Inspire Art] (2003) 56 Neue Juristische Woche 
3331, 3333–4. 
113 Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 329ff. 
114 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and Council of July 5 2006 of 5 July 2006 
on the Implementation of the Principle of Equal Opportunities and Equal Treatment of Men 
and Women in Matters of Employment and Occupation, OJ L 204/23 (‘Equal Treatment 
Directive’). 
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supervisory board mandate does not fall under ‘access to employment including 
vocational training and promotion’.115  
A breach of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR), 
particularly articles 15 and 16 CFR (freedom of occupation and freedom to 
conduct a business), article 17 CFR (right to property), and article 23 CFR 
(equality between men and women), is therefore ruled out. The principle applies 
that the European fundamental rights are interpreted in line with the 
constitutional traditions of the member states (CFR article 52 paragraph 4), so 
that no differences from German constitutional law arise.116 
V EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION 
The legal situation in Germany must be critically evaluated. The issue of lack 
of compatibility with German constitutional law is particularly problematic. It 
would not be surprising if the German Federal Constitutional Court had soon 
to make a decision on the constitutionality of a quota on women. It would be a 
severe setback if the quota did not withstand a judicial review — not just for 
the ‘quota on women project’ but also for the advancement of women in 
general.117 
Besides the issue of constitutionality, however, there are also content-related 
problems related to introducing gender quotas for boards of company 
management. Ultimately, with such a huge change to company law, the 
systemic coherence of the quota on women would have to be scrutinised.118 The 
strict quota regulation of 30 per cent has the disadvantage that companies are 
forced to keep a specific number of positions free for women. If one assumes 
that, for a short period of time some industries will have too few qualified and 
experienced women who are prepared to take on a supervisory board role, the 
quota regulation would have at least to include a hardship clause119 — as 
preferred by the CDU and CSU.  
However, the fact that a flexi-quota has been introduced for a number of 
companies must be welcomed. This means that some companies still have some 
leeway. First, this has the advantage of allowing the companies themselves, 
115 Equal Treatment Directive, above n 114, art 1(a). Schladebach and Stefanopoulou, above n 9, 
1045; Brandt, above n 8, 249ff; but cf Papier and Heidebach, above n 11, 331. 
116 See also Brandt, above n 8, 236ff. 
117 François-Poncet et al, above n 77, 454. 
118 Weller, above n 26, 19. 
119 Spindler and Brandt, above n 96, 404. 
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which are most able to do so, to assess how many women qualified for the 
supervisory board are currently available in the particular company. 
Additionally, a flexi-quota, as opposed to a strict quota, better fits into the basic 
principles of German private law, particularly into the principle of private 
autonomy.120 With flexi-quotas, the recommendations of the German 
Corporate Governance Code can also be continued, as additional binding 
provisions apply besides the target provisions of the GCGC. The extension of 
the GCGC’s recommendations would not have been expedient.121 Embedding 
the quota on women into the law governing stock corporations is the next 
logical step.122 The stipulation that the target figures must include at least one 
woman and one man would certainly have had to be rejected, because — as 
already demonstrated — this would have introduced a strict quota regulation 
for over 60 per cent of the affected companies. For a number of companies, 
there would not have been much left of the advantages of flexible organisation. 
The amendment of the draft bill on 9 September 2014 achieved a mitigation of 
the original plans which must be considered positive. 
It is also to be welcomed that, in the event of a company’s failure to observe 
the legal provisions, an appropriate sanction is associated with the invalidity of 
the election of the affected supervisory board member. A quota on women 
without sanctions would hardly improve the legal situation, as the GCGC’s 
recommendations are already in place.123 Instead of invalidity, contestability 
could also have been laid down as a sanction.124 The choice of one option or 
the other ultimately depends on how strongly one wishes to impose sanctions 
for violations. Draconian penalties,125 such as the compulsory dissolution of the 
company imposed by Norwegian law, would have been wholly unsuitable, 
however.126 Fines should also be rejected,127 at least where they are the only 
type of sanction. Should fines be accepted, companies would in a sense be able 
to ‘pay a ransom’ to avoid the legal provisions. Finally, it must also be 
welcomed that there are no sanctions in case of a violation of the flexi-quota. 
The lack of sanctions corresponds to the fact that the flexi-quota is a target set 
by the company itself. Furthermore, the duty to disclose information on whether 
120 Weller, above n 26, 19; see also Krieger, above n 20, 918. 
121 Thus justifiably Bayer, above n 6, 9; but cf François-Poncet et al, above n 77, 454. 
122 Also Bachmann, above n 88, 1136. 
123 Bayer, above n 6, 9. 
124 Invalidity is preferred by Bachmann, above n 88, 1138; on the other hand, contestability is 
argued by Langenbucher, above n 5, 1045–6; Weller, above n 26, 19. 
125 Bachmann, above n 88, 1138. 
126 Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 178. 
127 For example, Italian law stipulates that fines of up to €1m can be enforced: Teichmann and 
Langes, above n 27, 181. 
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the targets were reached or not (comply or explain) already exerts pressure on 
the particular company.128 
There are also outstanding issues concerning the European perspective. In view 
of the variety of regulations on the Continent, the European Union’s draft bill 
must be critically evaluated against the principle of subsidiarity.129 In 
accordance with article 5 paragraph 3 of the Treaty of the European Union 
(TEU),  
the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central 
level or at regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or 
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level.  
The quota on women is a current example of a conflict of jurisdiction between 
European and national legislation.130 The European Commission justifies the 
compatibility of the Draft Quota on Women Directive with the principle of 
subsidiarity by stating that some member states would not be willing to 
introduce quotas on women, and secondly by stating that the absence of 
statutory quotas in some member states and the sometimes different 
organisation of existing quotas would have a negative impact on the European 
Single Market.131 However, the various regulations already in existence and the 
new law in Germany show that gender quotas can be implemented on a national 
level.132 Furthermore, the argument of a risk to the European Single Market 
seems to be exaggerated. It must also be noted that a ‘European quota on 
women’ may conflict with national constitutional law,133 and may ultimately 
affect the different structures of supervisory boards in the individual 
128 Thüsing, above n 60, 372. 
129 See also Marco Buschmann, ‘EU-Grünbuch zur Corporate Governance: Alter Wein in neuen 
Schläuchen?’ (2011) 14 Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 87, 90; Möllers and Hailer, 
above n 3, 850 with further references. 
130 Similarly Möllers and Hailer, above n 3, 850. 
131 EC Draft Directive 2012, above n 12, 10–11. 
132 Buschmann, above n 129, 90. 
133 Institut für Gesellschaftsrecht der Universität zu Köln, ‘Stellungnahme zum Grünbuch der 
EU-Kommission vom 5. 4. 2011: Europäischer Corporate Governance-Rahmen’ (2011) 14 
Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 975, 977. 
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countries.134 Therefore, to uphold the principle of subsidiarity, blanket 
European regulations should be rejected.135 
Finally, the fact that companies in the legal form of a SE also fall under the 
quota regulation might result in a possible conflict with European law.136 The 
German Ministry of Justice has always preferred the inclusion of the SE in the 
scope of application of the quota on women. Otherwise there might have been 
the risk of companies being able to circumvent the quota by changing their legal 
form.137 However, in the draft bill of June 2014 no strict quota was imposed on 
such companies: they ‘should’ only fulfil the 30 per cent quota.138 This means 
that they were exempt from the requirement of a fixed quota. Therefore it is 
quite surprising that the German legislator has now returned to the original 
plans of the Ministry of Justice.   
VI SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
The issue of quotas on female membership of corporate boards has been a topic 
on the Continent for a long time, and has now again become a focal point of 
company law due to the legislative actions of Germany and the EU. The 
political decision to impose quotas has already been made. Nevertheless, 
current procedures must still be followed critically, and alternative proposals 
must still be made. Due to the disputed constitutionality of the quotas in 
Germany, the last word on the specific structure of a legal quota on women has 
still not been spoken. Irrespective of the constitutional law dimension, the 
legislator should have introduced strict gender quotas only as a last resort. A 
solution in terms of flexi-quotas should have been sought instead. Flexi-quotas 
are a balance between strict quotas in the sense of state compulsion and non-
binding recommendations from the Corporate Governance Code. They largely 
protect corporate co-determination, whilst at the same time taking the state’s 
134 A distinction is made here between dualistic and monistic company organisation: see 
Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 177. 
135 Also Buschmann, above n 129, 90; Institut für Gesellschaftsrecht der Universität zu Köln, 
above n 133, 977; BT-Drucksache 17/6506, 4 (Parliamentary Documentation of the German 
Bundestag) <http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/065/1706506.pdf>. 
136 Barbara Mayer, ‘Gesetzentwurf zur Frauenquote mit einigen Überraschungen’ (12 August 
2014) Friedrich Graf von Westfalen and Partners Lawyers <http://www.fgvw.de/2367-0-
Gesetzentwurf+zur+Frauenquote+mit+einigen+Ueberraschungen.html>.  
137 Karl-Heinz Büschemann, ‘Ganz andere rechtliche Fragen’ Süddeutsche Zeitung, 9 May 2014, 
19.  
138 SEAG-E § 17 para 2 and SEBG-E § 21 para 5 as in the Draft Act for the Equal Participation 
of Men and Women in Management Positions in Private Industry and Public Services, above n 
35. 
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duty to realise gender equality into account (article 3 paragraph 2 clause 2 GG). 
At European level, the topic of quotas on women should be dealt with carefully. 
For reasons of subsidiarity, responsibility should remain with national states.  
It remains to be seen whether quotas on women can fulfil the expectations held 
of them. It can certainly be expected that the introduction of a quota will 
increase the proportion of women on supervisory boards. Additionally, with 
female supervisory board members, a new, independent professional profile 
could be established for the future, which would not least promote the 
professionalisation of supervisory boards.139 It is uncertain whether quotas on 
women will improve the professional promotion of women on supervisory 
boards, as can be seen from looking at developments in Norway. A recent study 
there found that, despite the introduction of a quota on women in 2003, the 
proportion of women in middle management positions has remained 
unchanged, and has only increased on the highest management level. The wage 
gap between men and women has not changed significantly either; in other 
words, the quota on women has not yet led to an integral change in working 
conditions for women.140 These experiences show that the topic of female 
advancement must be approached from many sides. Solely limiting this to an 
increase in the proportion of women on supervisory boards is not sufficient. 
The fact that in Germany now targets for management positions below the 
supervisory and the executive board must also be set, is therefore a step into the 
right direction. Nevertheless, changes must be made on other levels as well.141 
Today, the question of whether women pursue a professional career 
increasingly depends on the compatibility between family and a career.142 This 
can be seen in Sweden and Denmark, where — as previously discussed — there 
are still no statutory quotas. In spite of this, the proportion of women on 
supervisory boards is well over 20 per cent there.143 It is true that female 
advancement is on the political agenda. However, it is questionable whether 
company law should be used as an important vehicle to achieve it. On the one 
hand, quotas on women are a foreign body in company law; on the other hand, 
 
139 Bachmann, above n 3, 189. 
140 Lin Freitag, ‘Wird Norwegen vom Vorbild zum Versager?’, Die Zeit (online), 13 August 2014 
<http://www.zeit.de/karriere/2014-08/frauenquote-fuehrungskraft-unternehmen-norwegen>. 
141 Similarly Redenius-Hövermann, above n 88, 666. 
142 Hirte, above n 14, 368f, 379. 
143 Teichmann and Langes, above n 27, 179. 
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they are insufficient. For professional advancement, there must be, if nothing 
else, comprehensive family-related political reforms and improvements — 
regardless of gender!144 
144 Bachmann, above n 3, 189; see also Peltzer, above n 20, 283; Thüsing, above n 14, 16; 
concerning the different options see Hirte, above n 14, 379. 
                                                 
